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FROM FATHER TO SON: CANADIAN JEWRY’S
RESPONSE TO THE ALBERTA SOCIAL CREDIT
PARTY AND THE REFORM PARTY OF CANADA
This article examines the response of the Canadian Jewish
Congress to the anti-Semitic propaganda within the Social
Credit movement in Alberta under Ernest Manning in the
1940s, and its response to the Reform Party of Canada’s right-
wing agenda and incidents of intolerance under his son, Preston
Manning, in the 1990s. The article discusses how the national
representative organization for Canadian Jewry evolved and
matured in the postwar period so that its passive, ineffective
approach to Social Credit’s intolerance was replaced by an
unequivocal and public questioning of the Reform Party’s agenda.
It argues that Preston Manning learned from his father’s errors
regarding anti-Semitism within populist parties, and resolved
that his party would not fall prey to such intolerance. Similarly,
the Canadian Jewish Congress was determined to confront the
Reform Party in a manner which it had been unable to muster
against Social Credit in the 1940s.   
THE FATHER
In 1935, the Social Credit movement under William
Aberhart won the Alberta provincial election in an unprece-
dented landslide. It took thirty-six years for Social Credit to be
bested, when Peter Lougheed’s Conservatives swept the polls in
1971. Newly-discovered archival evidence has revealed that
before, during, and following the Second World War, the
Alberta Social Credit party and government and the national
Social Credit party engaged in an extensive and prolonged anti-
Semitic propaganda campaign. This anti-Semitic propaganda,
originally expounded by Social Credit’s Scottish founder,
Major C.H. Douglas, was based on the theory that an interna-
tional, Jewish financial conspiracy was attempting to take over
the world. The nature of the propaganda, although purely
rhetorical and mostly confined to attacking the “shadowy”
international Jewish financier, nonetheless greatly concerned
the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC), the national representative
organization for Canadian Jewry. The CJC, newly re-organized
in 1933 to meet the rising tide of anti-Semitism in Canada and
Europe, was poorly-equipped to confront Social Credit’s 
anti-Semitic propaganda. For years the CJC conducted anti-
defamation work, goodwill educational campaigns, public
appeals against race hatred, and even direct confrontation of
Social Credit politicians, in an attempt to persuade Social
Credit to abandon its anti-Semitic campaign. Its efforts often
were met with failure and at times negative repercussions—for
several reasons. First, there was little public or political support
for Jewish and other minority groups at the time; second, there
were fewer legal remedies available then to combat group libel
and defamation; third, Social Credit leaders, when confronted
by the CJC about their anti-Semitic propaganda, refused to deal
with the CJC in good faith; and finally, the CJC lacked a strong,
concerted public relations policy which could effectively confront
and eliminate such anti-Semitic attacks. A few selected exam-
ples of the response of the CJC to Social Credit’s anti-Semitic
propaganda will reveal the difficult nature of both the problem
and the attempted solution.1
One of the biggest disseminators of anti-Semitism in the
Social Credit movement was the party organ, Today and
Tomorrow (renamed the Canadian Social Crediter in 1944). Its
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main purpose was to inform readers about the international
Jewish financial conspiracy. It argued that international finance
was comprised of a small group of men, mostly of Jewish origin,
which operated behind the scenes to manipulate the world
money system in order to establish a world slave state under its
control. The conspiracy was responsible for any adverse inter-
national event, including the world-wide Depression of the
1930s, the totalitarianism of Germany and Russia, the Second
World War, and the socialism within European and North
American democracies. The paper’s most common strategy was
to openly declare that the conspiracy was international and
financial but imply or only occasionally state that it was Jewish.
Most of the articles in Today and Tomorrow were written by the
paper’s editorial board, led by John Patrick Gillese, and by
Social Credit politicians. Many articles quoted verbatim from
Social Credit politicians’ public speeches.
Leaders within the CJC had been reading Today and
Tomorrow since 1935 and viewed it with growing alarm. By
1942, two CJC officials in Alberta, L.M. Fradkin of Calgary
and H.A. Friedman of Edmonton, believed that the anti-
Semitism displayed in the party organ, if allowed to go
unchecked, “may develop into something serious to the Jewish
people of Alberta and Canada.”2 Accordingly, they arranged for
a CJC official from Winnipeg, Rabbi Solomon Frank, to
approach Premier Aberhart, confront him with the fact that his
party organ contained anti-Semitism, and hopefully persuade
him to bring Today and Tomorrow in line. The meeting took
place in early 1942 while Aberhart was attending a Social
Credit conference in Winnipeg. During the course of their meet-
ing, Aberhart gave Rabbi Frank the following assurances:
1. That anti-semitism and racial hatred of any
kind are entirely foreign to [Aberhart’s] own phi-
losophy of life.
2. That [Aberhart] deprecated most strongly any
anti-Semitic tendencies on the part of members
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of his party. Furthermore that he had taken it
upon himself ... to express himself in accordance
with this thought to those of his party who were
guilty of anti-semitic statements. Though he
would want his party to be clear from any racial
or religious biases of any kind, he of course
could not be held responsible for isolated utter-
ances, particularly when these ran counter to his
way of thinking.
3. That if, in spite of [Aberhart’s] repeated 
warnings to the contrary, these anti-semitic 
utterances on the part of his membership were to
continue, he would take whatever steps he 
possibly could in order to definitely squelch any
anti-semitic tendency.
Rabbi Frank noted that Aberhart “seemed sincerely upset by the
actions of those within his party that would seek to connect him
with anything of an anti-semitic character.” Although Aberhart
did not ask that their conversation be kept confidential, the rabbi
felt that any statement made by a man in public office must be
treated with a certain degree of confidence. Accordingly, he
insisted that Aberhart’s statements not be publicized.3
It is interesting that Aberhart did not dispute that some
Social Credit politicians were spouting anti-Semitism. Rather,
he adopted a tone of apology and even personal injury that
members of his movement were engaging in such destructive
actions. This stance was significant because it would not be
continued after Aberhart’s death. After 1943, Social Credit’s
anti-Semitic propaganda would become more daring and vocal,
while Social Credit leaders like national party leader Solon
Low and even Premier Ernest Manning would deny that their
party was anti-Semitic. Even more noteworthy is the fact that,
notwithstanding Aberhart’s and Frank’s mutual conventions of
etiquette, little was done to solve the real problem, which was
the promotion of anti-Semitism through the Social Credit party
organ. Aberhart’s assurances aside, there was no attempt to
silence those promoting anti-Semitism, and the CJC did not
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push the matter further. Consequently, because of its tactics 
of quiet diplomacy, an opportunity for the CJC to publicize 
the dangers of Social Credit’s anti-Semitism and, even more 
importantly, to publicize Aberhart’s acknowledgment of the
problem, had been relinquished.
When Ernest Manning took over the premiership after
Aberhart’s death in the spring of 1943, he stepped into his men-
tor’s shoes. Having been a cabinet minister since 1935 (the
youngest in the British Commonwealth), Manning was well
aware of Social Credit’s anti-Semitic predilections. By this time
too the CJC was convinced that anti-Semitism was an
entrenched part of the Social Credit movement and would not
be eradicated easily. As the Second World War progressed, so
too did Social Credit’s denunciations of Allied cooperation and
plans to create an international peacekeeping association in the
postwar period, which it viewed as part of the international
Jewish financial conspiracy. Even more disturbing for the CJC
was Social Credit’s opposition to the acceptance of Jewish
refugees because it suspected they were fabricating the extent of
their persecution to further the aims of the Jewish world plotters.
Notwithstanding the increasingly offensive nature of
Social Credit’s anti-Semitic propaganda, the CJC continued to
respond in an ineffective and passive manner. CJC officials per-
sisted in believing they could use moral suasion and facts about
the reality of Jewish wealth and power to persuade Social
Crediters to abandon their anti-Semitic attacks. Such an
approach seriously underestimated the virulence of Social
Credit’s anti-Semitism and the intransigence, duplicity, and
complicity of Social Credit leaders.
After Manning took over the helm he was confronted
with an entrenched faction of Social Credit purists who 
promoted Douglas’s anti-Semitic theories. Although Manning
himself embraced Douglas’s social credit theories and 
wholeheartedly attacked the international financial conspiracy,4
he was less comfortable with the Douglasites’ overt anti-
Semitism. Faced with an upcoming summer election in 1944
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and barraged by accusations of Nazism by Alberta Co-operative
Commonwealth Federation leader Elmer Roper, Manning
decided to wipe the pre-election slate clean. On 2 March 1944,
he issued a public statement in which he “unequivocally” repu-
diated anti-Semitism within the Alberta Social Credit movement.
However, his statement was remarkable for its equivocation:
It has been brought to my attention that an erroneous
impression has been created in certain quarters
that the Social Credit movement is anti-Semitic.
Nothing could be further from the truth ... Social
Credit is not opposed to any religion or race, as
such. It is only when the adherents to any religion,
or the people of any race take collective action as
a group to attack the principles of Christianity
and democracy which are fundamental to Social
Credit that conflict arises ... In exposing and
opposing the conspiracy of individuals and 
corporations seeking to impose a state of financial
and economic dictatorship upon all nations the
advocates of Social Credit consider it most
important that the facts of the case be placed
before the people irrespective of the color, race
or creed of the conspirators.5
Manning apparently believed it was both politically 
safe and morally correct to deny anti-Semitism but still expose
the “enemy” of Christianity and democracy, since its “color,
race or creed” was irrelevant. But his repudiation of 
anti-Semitism rang hollow and became even more suspect
when he compared Social Credit’s battle against the interna-
tional financial conspiracy with the party’s fight against
Nazism. He argued that, because Nazi Germany attacked
Christianity and democracy, this necessarily brought it in 
conflict with Social Credit, which upheld these principles.
“However,” declared Manning, “we were not attacking
Germans as Germans.”6 He made no further comment, but the
inference could be made: the fight against Nazism necessitated
war against Germans, but no one doing so was anti-German 
6 Janine Stingel
per se. Likewise, the fight against the international financial
conspiracy necessitated war against Jews, but no one doing so
was anti-Semitic.
One of the leading officials in the CJC, Louis
Rosenberg, had some comments about Manning’s repudiation.
“Evidently the leader of the Social Credit Party in Alberta does
not like to be called an anti-semite, although he has done 
nothing to repudiate the repeated anti-semitic remarks which
appear regularly in his official paper Today and Tomorrow
and the anti-semitic statements made by the Social Credit 
members in the House of Commons.” Moreover, stated
Rosenberg, the only difference between blatant anti-Semites in
the Social Credit movement and “more circumspect and careful
men” like Manning and the late Aberhart was that the former
invoked the word “Jewish” in their fulminations about 
the international financial conspiracy, whereas the latter “use
the same arguments and the same phraseology but omit the
word Jewish, leaving their true meaning to be understood.”7
Notwithstanding the CJC’s uneasiness with Manning’s
‘repudiation,’ it was not until December 1944 that Alberta CJC
officials attempted again to confront Social Credit on the issue
of anti-Semitism. That month CJC officials H.A. Friedman and
John Dower met with Solon Low, leader of the newly-created
national Social Credit party. Friedman and Dower met Low at
the legislative buildings in Edmonton and talked with him 
for nearly two hours about Social Credit’s attitude on the
“Jewish question.” They showed him several issues of the party
organ (now renamed the Canadian Social Crediter) which were
anti-Semitic. On the surface, the meeting went well. Low was
conciliatory, assuring both Friedman and Dower that he strongly
opposed anti-Semitism and that it definitely was not part of
Social Credit policy. He gave them “his personal assurance that
he would no longer tolerate the type of articles that we brought
to his attention in the party’s paper ... that he would disavow
any member of the party who indulged in Anti-Semitic state-
ments ... that he would ... make a public statement to the press
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on the question of Anti-Semitism, which he assured us we
would find fully satisfactory.”8
Shortly thereafter, Low gave a public address in
Lethbridge, Alberta in which he discussed Social Credit’s
stance on anti-Semitism. Unfortunately for the CJC, Low’s
statement was blatantly anti-Semitic. He began his speech by
stating: “some Jewish friends of our movement have told me
that we are being identified with anti-Semitism because of our
persistent and outspoken exposures of a group of international
financiers and world plotters who are engaged in a criminal
conspiracy to destroy democracy and Christianity and to
enslave mankind to their rule.” By construing his meeting 
with Friedman and Dower in these terms, Low simultaneously
refuted and reaffirmed Social Credit’s anti-Semitism. “Some 
of these men happen to be of Jewish racial origin,” he 
commented, “and to be more specific, of German-Jewish 
origin.” However, they were not exclusively Jewish, Low 
qualified, and although many were this was no reason to 
condemn Jews as a whole. Accordingly, it was important to
clarify for everyone, including Canada’s Jews, Social Credit’s
stance on anti-Semitism:
We very definitely are not anti-Semitic or anti
any race or religion ... The only times when the
Canadian Social Credit movement can possibly
be brought into conflict with any racial or 
religious group would be if those comprising
such a group conspired together as a group in an
organized attack on democracy and Christianity.
I am sure that our fellow Canadians of Jewish
origin recognize that a truly democratic and
Christian society ... alone will give them the
social objectives they seek as individuals in 
common with all Canadians ... it is fantastic for
anybody to suggest that as Social Crediters we
are anti-Semitic. I will go further and point out 
to our fellow Canadians of Jewish origin that
actually the Social Credit movement is the most
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powerful influence in the country working for
their emancipation.
Low also explained why anti-Semitism was “sweeping”
England, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, as well
as Canada. (Germany, interestingly, was not mentioned). 
His explanation served only to publicly reinforce Social
Credit’s anti-Semitism: “our Jewish friends should recognize
that the cause of the growing anti-Semitism ... is not due to 
propaganda alone ... anti-Semitism is spreading, because people
cannot fail to observe that a disproportionate number of Jews
occupy positions of control in international finance, in revolu-
tionary activities, and in some propaganda institutions, the
common policy of which is the centralization of power and the
perversion of religious and cultural ideals. This gives people the
impression that therefore there must be a Jewish conspiracy to
gain world control.”9
Low’s speech had made a mockery of his meeting with
Friedman and Dower and was the absolute antithesis of what
they had hoped for. Not surprisingly, Western CJC officials
were extremely dismayed by Low’s address and the entire CJC
leadership became extremely wary about openly confronting
Social Credit’s anti-Semitism in the future. What the CJC 
needed, but was not yet ready to create, was a public relations
approach which did not rely on the goodwill of those who 
promoted anti-Semitism.
By the end of the Second World War, the Social Credit
movement had proven its anti-Semitism through a new spate of
propaganda, the most offensive of which was denial of the
Holocaust. Throughout the immediate postwar period, until
Manning’s purge of the anti-Semites in 1947–48, Social Credit’s
anti-Semitic propaganda increased both in intensity and fre-
quency. During this period, the CJC was forced to confront the
very tragic implications of Hitler’s tyranny and acknowledge
that European Jewry had been nearly destroyed, while the
Canadian government had done virtually nothing to assist it.10
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While Social Credit propaganda railed again the United Nations
Organization, Soviet communism, and Zionism, all of which 
it deemed part of the international Jewish financial—and 
now overwhelmingly communist and Zionist—conspiracy,
Canadian public opinion on anti-Semitism and racism was
slowly changing with acknowledgment of the Holocaust.
This widening discrepancy between Social Credit’s
anti-Semitic propaganda and the nation’s emerging tolerance
encouraged the CJC to adopt a more assertive public relations
approach. Yet even before the end of the war, the CJC realized
the need to adopt a more assertive public relations approach and
work with other organizations to ensure that the race-hatred and
genocide of Nazi Germany did not occur in Canada. Thus, by
the immediate postwar period, the CJC concluded that it was
insufficient to convince non-Jews that Jews were indeed “good
people” or to simply correct all the slanders and misinformation
about Jews. It was more important to show that anti-Semitism,
race hatred, and intolerance were harmful to all society.
Accordingly, the CJC began a large-scale programme which
attempted to persuade group after group—labour unions, busi-
ness groups, church groups, farm groups—that anti-Semitism
was dangerous for all Canadians, not only for Jews.11
This emphasis on the universality of race hatred and 
the importance of combatting all forms of prejudice and dis-
crimination was crucial. By the early postwar period, the CJC’s
public relations approach was evolving and maturing so that it
encompassed more than anti-defamation work, and focussed
also on the broader social implications of prejudice and dis-
crimination.12 However, even though the CJC’s public relations
approach was shifting to a broad-based appeal against all race
hatred, it nonetheless remained an appeal—the organization still
assumed that anti-Semitism could be combatted by changing
the attitude of non-Jews.13 This assumption would greatly
impede its attempts to end Social Credit’s anti-Semitism. In the
early postwar period the CJC became increasingly assertive and
confronted Social Credit in a series of incidents,14 yet its efforts
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were continually thwarted by Social Crediters’ duplicity and
intransigence. When CJC leaders attempted to convince Social
Credit politicians that their anti-Semitism was harmful to
Canadian society as well as Canadian Jewry, the latter agreed
wholeheartedly and encouraged the CJC to denounce the 
international Jewish conspiracy so that anti-Semitism would
cease. These tactics made it difficult for the CJC to make many
inroads. The Social Credit movement appeared determined 
to continue and expand its anti-Semitic attacks, irrespective 
of any appeal.
However, events converged in such a way that Ernest
Manning solved the CJC’s problem for it. In late 1947 and early
1948 Manning conducted a purge of the anti-Semites within the
Social Credit movement. The editor of the Canadian Social
Crediter, John Patrick Gillese, was relieved of his position;15
writings by Social Credit’s most notorious anti-Semite, MP
Norman Jaques, were barred from the party organ, as were the
anti-Semitic writings of Social Credit’s founder, Major C.H.
Douglas;16 the propaganda arm of the movement, the Alberta
Social Credit Board, was disbanded;17 and in February 1948
Manning fired L.D. Byrne, technical advisor to the movement,
and R.E. Ansley, Alberta minister of education.18 In the wake of
Manning’s purge, other Social Credit politicians broke with the
movement and started their own splinter groups which
remained true to Douglas’s original, anti-Semitic principles.19
However, Manning’s authority prevailed and the official move-
ment was largely freed from the anti-Semitic propaganda which
had been its hallmark for years.
Certainly, a changed political and economic climate
provided much of the impetus for Manning’s action. In the
postwar, post-Holocaust world, anti-Semitism was considered
‘politically incorrect’ and Alberta’s economic fortunes after 
the 1947 Leduc oil strike precluded any further need to vilify
the “international bankers.” What most scholars have over-
looked in this regard is that Manning did not act until it was
politically and economically expedient to do so and, even more
From Father to Son 11
incriminating, as Social Credit leader he had been complicitous
in allowing anti-Semitism to exist in the party.20 Yet it must be
acknowledged that Manning ultimately vindicated himself by
removing his party’s most repugnant feature.
For the CJC, Manning’s purge of 1947-48 certainly
solved its “number one” public relations problem. By this time
as well the CJC was facing a different world. The pervasive
anti-Semitism of earlier years was receding, the horrors of the
Holocaust had shocked many Canadians and made race hatred
noxious, and Jews in Palestine had engaged in a dramatic strug-
gle to create their own state.21 Upon emerging from this era of
rampant anti-Semitism, the CJC embraced the philosophy
learned from European Jewry’s horrifying experience—“Never
Again.” For the CJC, “Never Again” should Canada’s 
and Alberta’s political culture embrace such intolerance. “Never
Again” would the CJC allow it. Accordingly, throughout 
the postwar period, the CJC modified its public relations 
philosophy to embrace a “zero-tolerance” approach to intoler-
ance. Its philosophy now accepted that Jewish protection
involved more than altering the attitude of non-Jews toward
Jews—its public relations work should ensure that the rights 
to which Jews were entitled in a democratic society were
respected, enforced, and granted.22
The CJC’s new approach was self-respecting, even
pugnacious. Its philosophy was now that Jewish rights were not
something to be begged or pleaded for or accepted with thanks,
but something which Jews could and should demand and fight for
legitimately. Jews’ status would not be protected by influencing
the attitudes of non-Jews or filling them with goodwill. Jewish
protection would come from enactments of public policy, legisla-
tion, administrative practices, and judicial precedents which
would make the practice of discrimination impossible. The CJC
did not abandon goodwill propaganda or educational campaigns
in the postwar period, and the efficacy of this kind of public rela-
tions work was still accepted. However, it realized that previous
public relations measures had basically left the root problem
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untouched—that the Canadian democratic system had allowed
large patterns of racism and discrimination to form part of the
social, political, and economic landscape of the nation.23 This
certainly had been the case with Social Credit’s anti-Semitic pro-
paganda campaign, which had operated for years with impunity.
In short, the CJC’s difficulties in responding to “the Social Credit
problem” played a significant role in compelling it to adopt a
more effective public relations approach in the postwar period.
Its negative and frustrating experience with Social Credit taught
it a valuable lesson about protecting and promoting the rights 
of Canadian Jewry and, indeed, all minority groups. The CJC’s
evolution and maturation would serve it well when, decades 
later, another prairie protest movement would emerge and identi-
fy specific ‘enemies’ in order to explain political, economic, and
social grievances.
THE SON
The Reform Party of Canada was established in 1987, in
the hopes of creating a new federal party of the right. Performing
a delicate balancing act between promoting itself as a western-
based regional party as well as a national party with national clout,
the party endorsed the slogan, “The West Wants In,” and under
Preston Manning’s effective leadership it gained over 100,000
members within four years.24 The idea of a federal party that
would have western interests first was very appealing to Albertans
and other westerners. As Ian Pearson notes, the Reform Party was
playing to the same sense of alienation that created the
Progressives in the 1920s and the Social Credit party in the 1930s:
In the eyes of Reformers, central Canada has
never stopped putting the boot to the prairies. But
beyond that, the Reformers are feeding off a 
frustration with politicians in general, a feeling
that the party system has atrophied and needs
substantial reform to revive it. Previous western
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populist movements appealed to different sectors
of the disfranchised: the poor, farmers, labour.
When Preston Manning pitches his message, 
he’s speaking not only to a core of farmers and 
disgruntled retirees but also to a potentially huge
group that feels abandoned by the established
political parties: the middle class. (The disaffected
rich also seem more than happy to go along for
the ride.)25
Along with its appeal to feelings of political alienation,
the Reform Party promoted other conservative populist values. 26
It was these values which helped give the party a reputation for
right-wing extremism. Specifically, the Reform Party’s original
platform included opposition to the Meech Lake accord, with
its recognition of Quebec’s “distinct society.” Stated Manning:
“either all Canadians make a clear commitment to Canada as
one nation ... or Quebec and the rest of Canada should explore
whether there exists a better but more separate relationship.”27
Murray Dobbin, in examining the party’s confrontational
approach to Canadian federalism, states that “the Reform party
is the only national party in Canadian history to explicitly
exclude Quebec from its charter.”28 (It should be added 
that Preston Manning later softened his position on Quebec 
in full realization that his party was doomed to the role 
of a western protest movement if it could not penetrate 
that province and Ontario; however, his attempts to learn
French and run candidates in la belle province proved over-
whelmingly unsuccessful.)
A corollary of the Reform Party’s inflexible and at times
inimical stance towards Quebec was its attitude toward bilin-
gualism. From its inception the party opposed the bilingual
policies of the federal government, and especially bilingualism
outside Quebec.29 Other planks included the party’s opposition to
Canada’s multicultural policy. Manning believed that the federal
government should “get out of the business of handing out
grants for the preservation and development of cultural distinc-
tion ... That should be the responsibility of individuals, private
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associations and lower levels of government, including the
provinces.”30 The Reform Party also opposed federal immigra-
tion policy and argued that, rather than pandering to politically
powerful ethnic groups by allowing more of their group into the
country, the government should judge applicants on economic
criteria. Perhaps unwittingly repeating what Liberal prime min-
ister Mackenzie King proposed in 1947, Manning declared that
immigration should be tied to Canada’s economic conditions
and “absorpt[ive] capacity.” More revealing, the Reform Party
manifesto stated that immigration policy should not be “explic-
itly designed to radically or suddenly alter the ethnic makeup of
Canada, as it increasingly seems to be.”31
Responses to the Reform Party’s platform were extreme-
ly varied. Not surprisingly, the party appealed to “people
opposed to multiculturalism and bilingualism and to the
Mulroney government’s alleged toadying to Quebec ...”32 But
Manning also espoused religious opinions which garnered broad
support. Like his father, Manning was an avowed Christian, and
he made no apology for inflecting his politics with Christian 
values. In The New Canada, he reveals his religious philosophy:
“when I am asked for a definition of my most deeply held 
values (that is, for a statement of faith), I could respond by recit-
ing the Apostles’ Creed or the statement of faith of any of the
various churches (Baptist, and Christian and Missionary
Alliance) that my family and I have attended. Such a statement
would not be very meaningful, however, to Canadians who have
abandoned or who have never subscribed to this country’s
Christian heritage.”33 Laurence Decore, former leader of the
Alberta Liberal party, in commenting on Preston Manning’s
“evangelical mystique,” states: “there’s something captivating
about a preacher and the way a preacher can get his message
across. His father had it and it’s all wound up in a western twang.
It’s wound up in the use of biblical images. It’s very populist.
And Preston’s got it down to the kind of perfection his father
had. It makes him very appealing, and makes him sound very
honest and forthright. I think it’s easy to like what he says.”34
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The Reform Party also had the blessings of Alberta
Report, a right-wing conservative newsmagazine which acted
as the party’s political cheerleader. 35 In one editorial, Alberta
Report commented that,
most media pundits detest religion ... Thus they
assume that if they represent Mr. Manning often
and at length as genuinely religious, people will
reject him as a sanctimonious, irrational bigot.
But in this they are deluding themselves. True,
the common man detests the self-righteous ... But
he sees far, far more sanctimonious fanatics
among the media and their think-alike friends—
the feminists, the socialists, the environmental-
ists, the multiculturalists and all the political
toadies in the other parties who suck up to them
... there is a plain and growing public gratitude
that Mr. Manning and 100,000 Reform party
members are restoring our freedom to think and
speak as we want.36
Alberta Report and the Reform Party reflected and shaped 
the political culture from which they came. Reform Party 
supporters, plagued by the same anxieties as their populist 
predecessors, sought a kind of salvation in this new national
party of the West. As Dobbin states, the party “promised to give
legitimacy and credibility to their concerns, their issues, their
yearning for the way things had been. And that was who turned
out to buy Reform Party memberships—those for whom the
modernization of Canada, as characterized by non-white 
immigration, multiculturalism, metrification, women’s right to
abortion and an awakened Quebec nationalism made them feel
alien in their own country.”37
Yet not all responses to the Reform Party were positive.
Critics of the party’s platform argued that the party’s stance on
“immigration, bilingualism, multiculturalism, the RCMP
uniform and other issues revealed a mean-spirited and intoler-
ant membership.” Some critics “detected an unsavory edge 
of intolerance in the Reform’s opposition to multiculturalism
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and the Meech Lake accord,” while others noted that most
Reform Party members seemed to be “white Anglo-Saxon men
with 18th-century views.” There were a few who explicitly
branded Reformers as “separatists and bigots” and labelled
their party “a right-wing WASP group that bemoans the fact
that Canada is not what it was 50 years ago.”38 One of the 
most vocal critics of the Reform Party was then deputy Liberal
leader Sheila Copps. In November 1991, shortly after ex-neo-
Nazi and former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke lost the race
for governor of Louisiana, Copps created an uproar in the
House of Commons by comparing Manning with Duke and
declaring much of the party’s platform “racist.” Copps further
asserted that unless Manning “absolutely” accepted the separa-
tion of church and state, his religious views and, specifically,
his belief that women should be submissive to men and that
homosexual acts were sinful, could help promote policies that
discriminated against women and gays. 39
Such accusations of intolerance were not mere diatribes
in the game of political one-upmanship. In early 1992 the
Reform Party expelled four members of the white supremacist
group, Heritage Front, including the group’s leader, Wolfgang
Droege. The same year Gordon LeGrand was thrown out of 
the party after he and others trampled a Quebec flag to protest
that province’s language policies, and Zvonimir Lelas was
expelled when it was discovered he had been convicted 
of defacing a synagogue.40 Manning’s response to the 
extremist tendencies of his party and the concomitant criticism
was, to borrow loosely from Murray Dobbin, calculatedly
ambiguous.41 Using an aphorism of his father’s, Preston 
stated: “If you turn on a light, you’re going to attract 
bugs.” Moreover, he added, “if you want change, remember
that change is messy. It will bring modern ideas and it will 
bring extreme ideas. It will bring contradictory ideas. If you
want change then you’ve got to get involved. Just because there
are some factors you don’t like, don’t make that the reason 
for not doing it.”42
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Manning also emphasized the importance and dignity of
the common voter—the rank-and-filer who was not afraid to
get involved to return the world to its proper order. Pointing to
his party’s populist base, Manning stated that “the convention-
al wisdom is not to let people express their opinions for fear that
they might embarrass a political party. Our policy is different.”
Further, he argued, “no reasonable person could consider as
racist” his party’s stance on multiculturalism and immigration.
“A party that challenges the status quo in any of these areas—be
it immigration, language policy, the Constitution—automatically
risks accusations of racism and extremism.” But as Ian Pearson
aptly notes, “Manning is careful to present moderate, general
policies, even though the ... members of the Reform Party 
are clamouring for severe action on fiscal matters, multicultur-
alism, immigration, language legislation, and Quebec’s status
within Confederation.”43
As recent political developments have shown, the
Reform Party’s stance had only limited appeal in a cosmopolitan,
multicultural, pluralistic democracy such as Canada. Thus,
notwithstanding the party’s attempt to broaden its electoral and
popular base (which caused an ideological contradiction in the
party’s raison d’être), its western protest origins remained largely
intact. Between Joe Clark’s rebuffs and vain attempts to place
old wine in a new bottle in the name of political transsubstanti-
ation, the Reform Party was consigned to the role it was best
suited for—an outlet for disenchanted, disgruntled westerners
who were tired of pressing their noses against the window of the
central Canadian ball. What is most intriguing is not the fact that
the Reform Party existed for thirteen years, but that it embodied
clear ideological continuities between the movements of father
and son. The enemies changed over the years—from the 
international socialist Jewish-Zionist banker to the political
interest group: feminists, socialists, environmentalists, 
multiculturalists, Quebec nationalists, and other “political toad-
ies.” However, the political culture which informed Social
Credit ideology and which informed Reform Party ideology
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remained relatively unchanged. Threatened social, political, 
and economic values acted as strong impetuses for a political
ideology which viewed external opposition in terms of ‘the
enemy.’ Manicheanism is far from dead in the West, and it has
proven extremely useful in defining Western Canada’s political
cultural identity in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
In essence, the Social Credit ideologues of Ernest Manning’s
era were succeeded by his son’s supporters within the Reform
Party fold. Therein lay an intriguing political continuity—the
perpetuation from father to son of the ideologically faithful.
THE CJC AND THE RPC
By the time the Reform Party was created, the Canadian
Jewish Congress was a strong, politically active organization,
capable of protecting and promoting Canadian Jewish and
minority group rights on many levels. Its response to the
Reform Party’s stance on immigration, multiculturalism, hate
crimes legislation, Nazi war criminals, and Quebec sovereignty
showed the extent to which the times had changed. Preston
Manning actively sought the goodwill of the CJC and other
Jewish community groups, and the CJC unequivocally
expressed its reservations about the party’s agenda and actively
attempted to persuade the party to adopt a more moderate
stance. This was a far cry from fifty years earlier, when CJC
officials tepidly met with Social Credit politicians in a vain
attempt to stop their anti-Semitic propaganda campaign, and
Social Credit leaders cavalierly dismissed the concerns of “our
Jewish friends.”
One of the first substantive interactions between the
Reform Party and the Canadian Jewish community was in
Calgary in 1990, when Manning discussed the anti-Semitism in
the Social Credit movement during the 1930s and 1940s. He
told Calgary’s Jewish leaders that “I despise racism in general,
and anti-semitism in particular,” and that “my own concerns
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about this issue are rooted in my father’s experience with 
exactly the same problem in the early days of the Social Credit
movement in Alberta.” Manning explained:
As many of you are aware, during the Depression
Western Canada produced ... the Social Credit
movement ... While the majority of its members
and leaders were sincere and well-intentioned
Canadians, the party did attract an element who
held conspiratorial theories about the Depression.
These people were looking for someone to blame
for the economic and financial problems of the
day, and they fixed on the “Jewish financiers.”
When my father became Premier of Alberta in
1943, he made a concerted effort to root this 
sentiment out of the party where it existed. This
involved calling for the resignation of a Cabinet
Minister and withdrawing membership from 
certain members of the Party. It involved public
statements, adverse publicity, and the loss of
some seats, but in the end it was successful.
Many of the older members of the Jewish com-
munity in Edmonton and Calgary will remember
those days, and my father sincerely appreciated
the support of those people. Eventually my father
was recognized for his efforts by the Government
of Israel, and by the B’nai Brith Society which
awarded him its national Humanitarian Award in
1982. If there was a lesson to be learned from the
Social Credit Depression experience, it is that ... if
a new political movement can prevent extremism
of any kind, particularly racism, from taking root
in the first place it will save itself and members 
of minority communities an infinite amount of
trouble later on.”44
This would not be the first time Manning would harken
to his father’s purge of the anti-Semites in an attempt to assuage
the concerns of the Canadian Jewish community. Indeed,
notwithstanding Manning’s determination that his party would
not fall prey to similar intolerance, by the time he met with
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Toronto Jewry in early 1993, he had ousted several members
and repeatedly reassured Jews that the Reform Party was not a
haven for racists and anti-Semites.45 In January 1993 Manning
gave a speech in Toronto hosted by the CJC, B’nai Brith
Canada, and the Jewish Civil Rights Education Foundation,
where he admitted that he had to fight racism in his party and
that he had already expelled “two dozen to 30” party members
who harboured racist views. Nonetheless, he defended his
party’s track record by pointing out that unacceptable members
were immediately kicked out. Moreover, stated Manning, the
Reform Party had taken several steps to “protect” its members
from extremism, including electing and supporting party lead-
ers who explicitly rejected extremism and racism; rejecting any
proposals which would discriminate on the basis of race and
expelling those members identified with racist organizations;
having potential candidates for nominations complete a forty-
page questionnaire to ensure they support Reform’s “aversion”
to discrimination; and issuing open invitations to members of
all racial minorities to examine the party’s policies.46
Manning also asked leaders of Toronto’s Jewish com-
munity to join his party in order to “inoculate” it against racism:
“I want to appeal for help, particularly from people like your-
selves ... Help us inoculate ourselves against the virus of racism
which could be absolutely fatal to a new party like ourselves
and to our country.” He added that if Reform became the gov-
ernment, race would not be a factor in anyone’s status, the
Constitution would be racially neutral, immigration policy
would be based on labour needs, and Canada’s multiculturalism
department would be abolished—henceforth it would be up to
private organizations and municipalities “to provide and polish
the pieces of the [Canadian] mosaic.”47
Jews attending Manning’s speech were not impressed.
One observer questioned Manning’s rationale for inviting Jews
to join the party: “[it] seems like a back-handed way of creating
racism, to say: ‘We need Jews to show we’re not racist.’” Karen
Mock, national director of B’nai Brith Canada, believed that
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people should look below the Reform Party’s surface: “I’m
worried about the white supremacists and known racists. I think
these people have an attraction to what might be behind the
words and behind the phrases.” Judy Feld Carr, a Syrian Jewry
activist, found some of Manning’s language and choice of
words “frightening,” and believed that his suggestion for Jews
to join Reform was itself racist. “I find him scary,” she
remarked, and she questioned why racists were attracted to the
Reform Party in the first place. Another observer similarly com-
mented: “I’m afraid, I’m really afraid ... He’s slick. He’s been
trained ... There’s a bit too much of ‘my Jewish friends.’”
(During his speech Manning referred several times to the fact
that he had Jewish friends.) Gabe Nachman, president of B’nai
Brith Canada, also expressed concern because Manning spoke
almost exclusively on racism: “maybe he thinks that’s all Jews
are interested in.” As for the CJC’s response, David Satok, chair
of the community relations committee for Ontario, considered
Manning’s comments on immigration to be “a little disturbing”
and felt they indicated a policy lacking in compassion. Satok
further doubted that private groups and municipalities would do
as good a job on multiculturalism as the federal government.48
Thus, Manning’s attempts at wooing the Toronto Jewish com-
munity were not as positive as he had hoped. Clearly the CJC,
along with other Jewish organizations, had no compunction
about publicly expressing its reservations about the Reform
leader and his party.
In fact, CJC national president Irving Abella strongly
voiced his opposition to the party. In November 1993, shortly
after the federal election in which the Reform Party had had to
oust candidates with intolerant views,49 Abella commented that
“the Reform party has simplistic answers to complicated ques-
tions. Parties of that type attract a certain fringe.” However, he
quipped, “I’m delighted there are nuts in the party, because if
they are not discovered, the party may gain more respectability
than it deserves.” Noting that the CJC had already met with
Manning, Abella remarked that “he’s not really a concern to us.
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Mr. Manning even represents a riding in Calgary that has a fair
number of Jewish people in it ... But he says he can’t find the
radicals in his party. We know Mr. Manning realizes these peo-
ple do harm to his party and he’d be delighted to have them out.
He’s told us, ‘You find them and we’ll throw them out.’”50
The CJC president also commented on the potentially
threatening aspects of the Reform Party: “given the fact the
[Progressive Conservatives] can’t raise funds as they did
before, and the fact Reform is on a roll and has momentum, it
just might accept people who are not racist but still have a racist
fringe hiding in back. If they play their cards right, then we
could be in trouble.” Further, stated Abella, the CJC was con-
cerned about the Reform Party’s recommendation for restrictive
immigration policies. Emphasizing that “the public doesn’t get
the real message of the importance of immigration in this coun-
try” since “immigrants have provided wealth and jobs and a
mosaic to Canada,” Abella noted that “people are too concerned
with only looking at queue jumpers and people gouging wel-
fare. That’s the message we all see and one the media transmits
and that’s wrong.” He added that many Canadians believed the
country was too much like a “United Nations” and were
opposed to further immigration of minorities. Consequently, “a
substantial part of the Reform party vote can be traced to that
feeling. They have a simple answer—‘Throw the bums out.”51
Abella’s words were not those of a passive organization head.
As CJC president, he accurately conveyed his organization’s
concern about the Reform Party’s potential threat to minority
group rights. Such reservations were well founded, for it was
not long before the Reform Party was embroiled in another
incident marked by intolerance.
In January 1994, a Reform Party newsletter produced by
the Okanagan Centre riding association in British Columbia
contained a quotation by Adolf Hitler. The newsletter, a single
broadsheet, carried a message from the newly-elected Reform
MP, Werner Schmidt, describing his first week as an MP and his
impressions of Parliament. The Hitler quotation was a filler,
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coming under the heading of “More Famous Quotes,” and stat-
ed: “What luck for rulers that men do not think.” The newsletter
had the Reform Party logo on its letterhead and gave the
Reform Party association office as its address. When the Hitler
quotation was discovered by the press, MP Schmidt declared: 
“I didn’t even know the quote was in there until the newsletter
hit the streets,” and he dissociated himself completely from the
quotation. He added later that “such a distasteful reference
should never have been made in a Reform Party publication and
I will be taking steps to ensure that such a situation does not
occur again.” The constituency association president also
announced that “any quotation by that despicable person has no
place in our Newsletter and we will take steps to ensure that no
similar incidents occur in the future;” meanwhile, the vice-pres-
ident admitted the reference was “not very politically correct.”
However, a local Reform executive assistant attempted to
defend the quotation’s inclusion by stating that it was not meant
to glorify the Nazi leader, but rather was meant as a warning
that citizens must monitor politicians to avoid giving power 
to leaders such as Hitler.52 Interestingly, some newspaper 
editorials defended inclusion of the quotation and discussed 
at length the issue of post-Holocaust hypersensitivity and 
ultra-political correctness.53
The CJC’s response, however, was unequivocal. Renée
Switzer Bellas, chair of the Pacific region of the CJC, stated
that “using the words of a murderer responsible for the 
annihilation of millions of men, women and children is highly
offensive to all Canadians, especially coming from an MP’s
newsletter.” Hal Joffe, the CJC’s national community relations
chair, called the newsletter insensitive and demanded an apolo-
gy by the MP to the people of Canada. B’nai Brith also sent a
letter to Manning expressing its dismay at the newsletter and
calling for assurances that there would be no repetition of “such
displays of insensitivity and poor taste.” Manning quickly
announced that “it was a big mistake” to have inserted the quote
and that “if it’s misinterpreted that would be a danger, I think.”
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Frank Dimant, executive vice-president of B’nai Brith, while
acknowledging Manning’s “quick” denunciation of the offend-
ing quote and Schmidt’s dissociation from the newsletter,
nonetheless urged Manning: “we seek your assurance that your
efforts continue to exclude from involvement in your party any
individuals who espouse racist and bigoted views.”54
While the CJC and other organizations were quick 
to respond to such incidents, the former also actively 
attempted to persuade the Reform Party to moderate its stance.
Approximately two months after the newsletter imbroglio, the
CJC again confronted the Reform Party about its potentially
threatening agenda. In March 1994 the two sides met in Ottawa,
where Abella and other CJC officials let Manning know about
issues which were important to it and the Jewish community.
They talked about immigration and multiculturalism, prosecu-
tion of Nazi war criminals, racism, and the role of the Reform
Party in Quebec.55
Abella told Manning that the Reform Party’s immigra-
tion and multiculturalism policies implied an intolerance for
certain minority immigrants, since they called for immigrants to
be selected solely on the basis of Canada’s economic needs. But
Manning assured the CJC delegation that his party did not want
to discriminate against any group; it simply wanted immigra-
tion to be compatible with the current economic climate.
Manning added that while he supported a cultural mosaic, he
did not believe the federal government should spend money to
preserve it. To this Abella later commented: “the concern was
that there is really a subtext in this and you’ve got to be careful
... This is a country of immigrants, which hates immigration and
[the Reform Party] is playing up to that feeling. And [Manning]
realized that.” Yet Abella was pleased with Manning’s support
for prosecution of Nazi war criminals in Canada, a process the
CJC believed had been too slow. Although Manning was not
well-informed about the issue from the point of view of the
Jewish community, stated Abella, once it was explained to him
he agreed to apply pressure on the federal government by ask-
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ing questions in the House of Commons about the prosecution
of war criminals. The meeting concluded with Abella agreeing
to keep Manning informed of any racists or “trouble makers” in
the Reform Party who came to the attention of the CJC.56
When questioned by the press about their meeting, both
Abella and Manning agreed it was a productive discussion of
issues which were of concern to the Jewish community. Abella
was convinced that Manning would not tolerate racism or anti-
Semitism in his party: “Mr. Manning is a very impressive man
and I think his heart is in the right [place],” stated Abella.
“We’re concerned about some of the people in the Reform
party, some of the things they’ve said and continue to say. But
his indication was that he would be trying to keep these people
under control and make sure they don’t speak on behalf of 
the party.” For his part, Manning acknowledged the CJC’s 
concern about racist elements in the Reform Party: “Congress
is extremely concerned about racists and anti-Semitic people 
that try to infiltrate political parties, and particularly new 
ones ... and we’ve done a lot to prevent that happening to the
Reform party.”57
One revealing aspect of this meeting which was not
conveyed to the press was the private conversation between
Abella and Manning, which occurred without the presence of
executive assistants, minute-takers, or press secretaries. For
nearly an hour the two men sat in a room and simply talked.
Manning told Abella that one of his children had spent some
time in Israel living in a kibbutz and he expressed his admira-
tion for the impact Israel had made. After other small talk they
turned to Canadian immigration policy, where Abella cited
study after study which proved the benefits of immigration to
Canada. Their discussion was not unlike a graduate history
seminar, Abella remembers, in which he regaled Manning with
the hundreds of books and articles which supported increased
immigration as a boon to Canada, and referred to the only one
or two studies which did not. When this “very friendly and very
unusual” discussion came to close, Manning called his assistant
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in and asked if Abella could give him the titles of the two stud-
ies which were critical of increased immigration. “At that
moment,” recalls Abella, “I realized how totally unpersuasive 
I had been.”58
Manning undoubtedly hoped his amicable meeting with
Abella and the CJC delegation was a prelude of things to come,
and he carried his goodwill ambassadorial campaign into the
new year. In February 1995, in an attempt to build relations
with the Quebec Jewish community and generate support for
Reform Party by-election candidates in that province,59
Manning met with twenty-five leaders of the CJC, B’nai Brith,
Federation CJA, and the Canada-Israel Committee in Montreal.
The meeting was Manning’s first with the Quebec Jewish com-
munity, and came four days before the Reform Party fielded it’s
first candidates in three federal by-elections in Quebec.60
The meeting, however, was not as successful as Manning
had hoped. Montreal Jewish community leaders left the meeting
disappointed that the Reform Party leader had not shown greater
sensitivity to the issue of Nazi war criminal prosecution, or to the
situation of anglophones in Quebec. B’nai Brith national vice-
president Stephen Scheinberg believed that Manning missed an
opportunity to favourably impress his Jewish audience. “It would
have been easy for him to say he believes Canada should move
vigorously on Nazi war criminals, given that he knows Jews are
unhappy with the federal government’s decision to prosecute
only four more of them and deport the rest,” Scheinberg said.
“He just didn’t have anything to offer us.”61
Manning also seemed to irritate Jewish leaders when he
implied that prosecuting perpetrators of more recent atrocities
was more important than going after “80- and 90-year olds.”
Thomas Hecht, chair of the Quebec region of the Canada-Israel
Committee, was so incensed by the remark that he called
Manning later for a clarification. “He showed a great degree of
insensitivity,” Hecht stated. “The Holocaust cannot be com-
pared to ordinary, garden-variety war crimes. The Holocaust
was unique in the history of mankind.” Manning’s position on
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Quebec sovereignty also did not go over well with his audience.
B’nai Brith regional executive director Robert Libman, who
organized the meeting, believed that Manning’s “continuous
attacks” on the constitutional status quo would only help then
Quebec premier Jacques Parizeau. “He seemed to lack an
understanding of what Quebec is all about,” Hecht remarked. “I
can’t see how he will achieve anything here if he continues to
talk about equality among the provinces.”62
Yet most of the Jewish community leaders seemed
favorably impressed by Manning as a person. “His non-dema-
gogic posture and sincerity is very attractive for the ’90s; we
just disagree with almost everything he said,” stated B’nai
Brith’s vice-president. The CJC’s Quebec regional chair,
Manuel Shacter, similarly commented: “he came across as a
reasonable person, very low-key and quite well-informed.”
Shacter added that he believed Manning was open to sugges-
tions from Quebecers on how to approach the constitutional
issue, and that he would ensure his party did not appear to be
hostile to Quebec’s aspirations. Nevertheless, Shacter sensed a
“wide gulf” between Manning and the Jewish leaders at the
meeting, notwithstanding many were pleased with Manning’s
quickness to root out extremist elements that might be attracted
to his party.63
Shortly after the Montreal meeting, Manning attempted
to build further bridges by granting an interview with the
Canadian Jewish News. There he stated that Nazi war criminals
should continue to be prosecuted in Canada but not deported, as
proposed by the Liberal government. “There’s no way any
country can compensate for the horrific things that happened to
the Jewish people, but this [prosecution] is one way we can say
‘never, never again.’” Manning also declared that there should
be no time limit on prosecutions, stating that the “biggest trib-
ute” Canada can pay to the memory of Jewish victims is to be
“vigilant” against the perpetrators of more recent atrocities who
may seek refuge in Canada. “Some think they can find safe
haven here, and that’s an insult to the memory of those killed
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during the war.” Manning again invoked the lessons learned by
his father on the issue of anti-Semitism. As leader of the Social
Credit party in Alberta, stated Manning, his father had faced the
same challenge of fighting anti-Semitism within its ranks. Those
who blamed Jewish financiers for causing the Depression did
infiltrate the Socreds, but the younger Manning was proud that
his father had “rooted them out and even fired some who were
quite high up.”64
Manning’s interview smoothed relations with the
Montreal Jewish community, although his overtures did not
have much effect on Reform’s electoral chances in that
province. A few months later Manning attempted again to win
over the Canadian Jewish community by embracing Judaism—
or at least one of its holiest holidays. The day before Yom
Kippur in October 1995, Manning spoke to an audience of 
two hundred at Temple Sinai in Toronto, stating that he wanted
to atone for his past mistakes. Specifically, when Rabbi
Michael Dolgin asked him if, on the eve of the Jewish Day of
Atonement, he wished to make amends for past errors,
Manning said he regretted that the Reform Party had run some
extremist candidates in the last federal election. “In our 
desperate anxiety to get up to 200 candidates, we allowed some
small constituencies” to put forward questionable candidates,
confessed Manning. “We would have been better off running
185, than allowing those people to get in and discredit us.” He
emphasized that because the Reform Party was new, it was “vul-
nerable to infiltration by extremists,” but that “the most efficient
way of combatting anti-Semitism and racism is hard, practical,
on the spot education on what is socially acceptable.”65
Manning’s atonement at the synagogue was apparently
well received. According to Brotherhood president Harry
Berholz, an organizer of the event, Manning believed it was
important to speak at a synagogue to address “the issue of the
misperception of the public that the Reform Party is anti-
Semitic and racist.” Perhaps to dispel any suggestion that the
synagogue was attempting to woo Manning, Berholz pointed
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out that it was the Reform Party which initiated contact with the
temple and that “the Canadian Jewish Congress endorsed his
appearance at our temple.”66
Attempts at influence continued on both sides. The 
following spring, the CJC resumed efforts to moderate the
Reform Party’s agenda. In late April 1996, the two groups met
for two hours, during which time CJC executives, led by
national president Goldie Hershon, briefed Manning and a
small number of Reform MPs about issues of concern before
the Jewish community. The first item under discussion was hate
crimes legislation. In June 1995, then Justice Minister Allan
Rock had introduced Bill C-41, which would toughen penalties
for hate crimes against racial minorities and other groups such
as gays. The CJC had staunchly supported the bill but the
Reform Party had voted against it, largely because of its gay-
rights provisions.67 Yet at the meeting Manning emphasized
that disagreeing with the bill did not make his party racist or
anti-Semitic. He said that the Reform Party disagreed with the
Liberals’ method for implementing the bill, not the idea of more
severe penalties for convicted hatemongers. “There were
charges, fears and concerns that Reform might be anti-Semitic,
extreme or racist,” stated Manning. “We want to do everything
we can to dispel those fears and to get down to discussing the
real issues that concern communities.”68
Another issued raised by the CJC president was
Canadian unity. She spoke to the Reform members about the
importance of a unified country, and noted that Jews in
Montreal had voted overwhelmingly (97.3 percent) against
Quebec’s separation in the October 1995 referendum. After the
meeting, Hershon said the Reform MPs supported her calls for
a unified Canada.69 A third issue raised was the deportation of
suspected Nazi war criminals. Jack Silverstone, CJC’s national
executive director, spoke about his frustration with the delays in
prosecuting accused Nazi war criminals. “We desire to see
these cases move forward at a greater speed,” and he noted that
the Reform Party wholeheartedly agreed with this stance.
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Indeed, both Manning and the CJC agreed that Ottawa should
follow a two-track policy of prosecuting some suspects domes-
tically while deporting others.70
Yet differences between the CJC and the Reform Party
remained, especially regarding immigration and refugee policy.
On these issues, the CJC’s national chair of community relations,
Hal Joffe, chose his words carefully: “we approach immigration,
possibly, from a more inclusive perspective [than Reform].”
Thus, the evidence was mixed on how close the two sides came
to a meeting of minds. Although Joffe asserted that “we had a
very free exchange of ideas ... and I think it was quite produc-
tive,” he admitted that “we’ve agreed to disagree on [some]
issues.”71 But he also emphasized that discussing such differ-
ences “is part of our process of becoming aware where they
stand on issues and making them aware where we stand on
issues.” For his part, Manning agreed on the importance of
meeting with the CJC and noted that the Reform Party was try-
ing hard to bridge the gap between it and a community that had
not historically been sympathetic to the party: “we’ve been
doing this pretty consistently ...Certainly we’re anxious to build
bridges ... It’s part of a relation-building.”72
Perhaps Manning’s most embracing gesture towards the
Canadian Jewish community was his appearance at a Jewish
Business Network dinner in November 1997 in Côte St. Luc, a
predominantly Jewish municipality in Montreal. At the sold-out
dinner of over two hundred in a kosher restaurant, Manning
vowed to “do everything possible” to ensure that no one with
racist or anti-Semitic views was allowed into the party. He
repeated how he had learned this lesson as a boy from his
father. He recalled how his father had “purged” the Social
Credit party of a small element that held “conspiracy theories”
about the cause of the country’s economic collapse. “Some—
not all were infected—believed certain small groups were
responsible; some pointed to the Jewish financial community ...
I watched that struggle and I want to make sure that never 
happens in our party,” stated Manning. He again emphasized
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how his father went so far as to fire one cabinet minister and
some MLAs for their views, and was honored by B’nai Brith
for his efforts.73
Manning also repeated his well-worn assertion that
“there are those with racist views who will pick on a new party,
particularly in times of stress, thinking they can infiltrate and
influence it. The best way to inoculate against that is to encour-
age people who believe in civil liberties and opposing racial
prejudice” to join the party. Manning extended the olive branch
further by expressing his wish that the Jewish community
would get to know him and his party, since its strong tradition
of family and volunteerism could have a valuable impact on the
party’s social policy. “We know our publicity in Quebec has not
been the best,” Manning added. “We ask that you avoid pre-
judging on the basis of innuendo or secondary information. 
As your community knows well, prejudging is the basis of 
prejudice.” Manning even ventured that there might be a natural
affinity between Jews and the Reform Party because both were
concerned with reform. “In every field, from science and music
to law and politics, Jews have been reformers in the sense of
changing society for the better. They have had the courage to
act and take all the criticism that comes from advocating 
systemic change.”74
The times certainly had changed. It was fifty years to
the month from the time Ernest Manning began his purge of the
anti-Semites to his son’s speech at the kosher restaurant in
Montreal. The two images were the epitome of contrast: a cap-
in-hand Jewish organization hoping a fundamentalist prairie
populist leader would stop his party’s anti-Semitism, to a cap-
in-hand fundamentalist prairie populist leader hoping to woo
Canadian Jewry. The irony was palpable. But the transformation
was not by chance—the CJC was not the same organization
as fifty years earlier. After decades of difficult and at times
painful progress, and assisted greatly by changing trends in
minority group rights, the CJC was now a powerful lobbying
force on the Canadian political scene, committed to protecting
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and promoting the rights of all minority groups. Any politician
who disregarded or rebuffed such an organization did so at his
own peril. Preston Manning was not that naive. Moreover, the
Reform Party was not the Social Credit party. For all his party’s
limitations, provincialism, intolerance, and general lack of
political correctness, the son had indeed learned from his
father’s errors. Rather than ignoring or complicitly condoning
fellow party members who espoused intolerant views, Preston
Manning acted swiftly and, perhaps, even courageously. While
the ideological connections of intolerance remain an intriguing
thread between the two populist parties, the filial connection
must be distinguished—Preston Manning’s alacrity in ousting
bigots was a significant departure from that of his father, who
did not eradicate his party’s long-standing anti-Semitic cam-
paign until well after the near destruction of European Jewry.
Perhaps, then, it was not so surprising for both the Canadian
Jewish Congress and the Reform Party of Canada to say,
“Never Again.” 
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